This paper investigates the compatibility of inflation targeting and Post Keynesian economics by examining the macroeconomic consequences of a variety of policy reaction functions for an economy that is explicitly Post Keynesian in character. It is shown that in this Post Keynesian environment, it is possible for the policy authorities to both set and achieve an inflation target without adverse consequences for the real economy, as long as an appropriate policy mix is chosen. One of the key results of the paper is that orthodox policy regimes do not provide appropriate policy mixes. Indeed, the more orthodox the policy regime becomes, the less viable is inflation targeting in a Post Keynesian economy.
Introduction
The idea of inflation targeting is anathema for many Post Keynesian economists, because of concern with the potential real costs (in terms of foregone output and employment) of a singular focus on low inflation as the goal of macroeconomic policy. 1 This concern becomes acute when inflation targeting is understood to involve not just the pursuit of low inflation enshrined in a target that public policy authorities credibly and accountably commit to achieve, but also -and more specifically -the dedicated use of monetary policy to achieve this goal.
2 But according to Setterfield (2006a) , Post
Keynesian concerns with inflation targeting can be finessed as soon as it is recognized that inflation targeting can be accommodated even in an economy in which output and employment do not automatically gravitate towards unique supply-determined equilibria.
This can be achieved simply by using more and different policy instruments to reconcile the pursuit of low inflation with other (real) macroeconomic policy goals.
3
The purpose of this paper is to engage in further consideration of the relationship between inflation targeting and Post Keynesian economics. The paper takes as its starting point the Extended Post Keynesian Model (EPKM) developed by Setterfield (2006a) , but identifies two important shortcomings of this model. First, it does not explicitly take into account the role of expectations in the inflation process. This is a curious omission given 1 Rochon and Rossi (2006) and Atesoglu and Smithin (2006) also call attention to the potentially adverse effects of inflation targeting on the wage share of income. 2 See, for example, Mishkin (2002) for this more stringent definition of inflation targeting. 3 The accommodation achieved in Setterfield (2006a) thus results essentially from application of Tinbergen's (1952) principle, that there needs to be as many policy instruments as policy goals. Note also that this accommodation establishes inflation targeting as just one objective of macroeconomic policy, rather than its only objective, and makes no presuppositions about the particular use to which monetary policy should be put. See also Michl (2006) on the importance of Tinbergen's principle in models of inflation targeting. Setterfield (2006a) is not the first or only author to claim that inflation targeting is compatible with Post Keynesian economics: see also Davidson (2006) , Sawyer (2006) and Palley (2006a Palley ( , 2006b ).
The basic model on which the analysis in this paper is based can be stated as the Post Keynesian theory of endogenous money, takes the form of an interest rate operating procedure. 5 The instrument for achieving changes in Z in equation [4] , meanwhile, must ultimately be some form of incomes policy, where incomes policies are defined as formal and/or informal institutions that frame and mediate aggregate wage and 4 The precise form taken by the policy reaction functions in [3] and [4] is subject to explicit scrutiny in section 3 below. For the time being, we need only note that, as will be demonstrated below, equations [3] and [4] are sufficient to resolve the "inflation targeting dilemma" (associated with the real costs of inflation targeting) alluded to in the introduction, and that arises in a Post Keynesian model whenever policy authorities are (a) exclusively committed to inflation targeting and (b) inclined to think of inflation as a strictly demand-pull phenomenon that can only be remedied by depressing aggregate demand conditions. See Atesoglu and Smithin (2006) , Davidson (2006) and Setterfield (2006a) for discussion of this dilemma. 5 Note that implicit in [3] is the notion that it is appropriate to use monetary policy (rather than, say, fiscal policy) to target real output. In the context of this paper, the choice of policy instrument in [3] is motivated by two factors. First, it swerves to draw attention to the real effects of monetary policy in a Post Keynesian economy. Second, as will become clear in section 3, it facilitates straightforward comparison and contrast of Post Keynesian and orthodox policy regimes, and thus serves a useful pedagogical purpose. Equation [3] is thus not intended to imply that monetary policy is necessarily superior to fiscal policy as an instrument for influencing real activity.
price setting behaviour in such a way as to reduce conflict over income shares and better reconcile conflicting income claims (Setterfield, 2006b) . 6 As discussed by Setterfield (2006b), incomes policies so-defined can be either cooperative or coercive, depending on whether the objective is to seek a mutually satisfactory reconciliation of competing income claims, or to achieve such reconciliation by so configuring institutions as to force one party (either firms or workers) to accept the distributional claims of the other. Hence the precise policy pursued in order to, for example, reduce Z might involve an effort to centralize wage bargaining, the creation of a tax-based or market anti-inflation plan (see, for example, Colander, 1986) , or changes in labour law designed to reduce the jobsecurity of workers. 7 The perspective adopted here is that any incomes policy will ultimately constitute a codification of the distribution of power in society. 8 Hence cooperative incomes policies can arise when labour has sufficient power, but there can also be coercive incomes policies that succeed in containing inflation, but are essentially an expression of capital's power vis a vis labour and its concomitant ability to impose its preferred distribution of income on labour. 9 Indeed, we would argue that the success of any incomes policy depends very much on its compatibility with the existing distribution of power in society, making policy design in this instance as much a socio-political as an economic exercise (on which, see Lima, 2004 . We would contend, however, that whilst the initial construction of an incomes policy is likely to be time consuming, its subsequent manipulation need not be. For example, in the classic tax-based incomes policy proposed by Wallich and Weintraub (1971) , the ultimate instrument of policy is a tax rate that should be amenable to change (at least within limits) even in the short run. 7 As should be clear from these examples, even policies that achieve similar reductions in Z may vary tremendously in the extent to which they are deemed equitable. 8 The precise form of an incomes policy may also be influenced by factors such as the size of an economy and/or the homogeneity of its population. 9 See Setterfield (2006b) for the argument that an incomes policy of this sort has operated in the US economy over the last 15-20 years.
In keeping with the Post 10 In this way, we are "locking up without ignoring" (Kregel, 1976) some of the dynamics of a Post Keynesian economy in an effort to focus attention on other dynamics in a "conditionally" or "provisionally" closed system (see Setterfield, 1997 and Chick and Caserta, 1997 . Closure is conditional or provisional in the precise sense that it depends on our ability to treat as unchanging certain features or elements of the economy that are, in principle, subject to change over time.
Note that the need to introduce such conditional closure cannot be avoided by simply adding more equations until our model is expressed in terms of Lucasian "deep parameters" and absolute closure is achieved. These "deep parameters" are assumed not to exist and the economy is, instead, treated as an open system (see Lawson, 1995) . Indeed, this is understood to be the source of the fundamental uncertainty that decision makers face in a Post Keynesian economy.
incomes policy or "social bargain" (Cornwall and Cornwall, 2001 ) that creates a conventional and mutually acceptable functional distribution of income that both capital and labour are content to maintain. This will reduce the willingness of workers to bid up wages at any given level of economic activity in an effort to translate the market power vested in them by the latter into a larger share of income. 11 In terms of equation [2] , the result will be a lower value of Z and hence, ceteris paribus, a lower rate of inflation. where:
with Ψ denoting decision makers' information set, Θ denoting their animal spirits and Φ denoting their creativity. The basic theory here is that in an environment of uncertainty in which there is no time-invariant true model on which expectations can be based, the latter are instead a product of what decision makers do know (or think they know) about the structure of the inflation process (the incomplete information set, Ψ), the capacity of decision makers to anticipate innovations that produce novel change in the structure of the inflation process (captured by their creativity, Φ) and decision makers' animal spirits (Θ), which influence expectations via their effects on "spontaneous optimism" (see Dequech, 2000, p.161) . Hence as in the first of the two equations immediately above, p e is conditional on the vector Ω that captures each of these influences -information, creativity and animal spirits -on expectations.
With expectations so-specified, the expectations-augmented Phillips curve becomes:
Notice that in addition to their impact on inflation expectations, animal spirits also exert a second and separate influence on the actual rate of inflation. This takes into account the fact that in an environment of uncertainty, behaviour (in this case wage and price setting)
is influenced not only by expectations themselves, but also by the confidence with which decision makers hold these expectations. In this way, a change in animal spirits, by altering decision makers aversion to and/or perception of uncertainty, can affect the confidence that they have in any given set of expectations and hence the behaviour based on these expectations (Dequech, 2000, p.161) . This is an example of what Gerard (1995) identifies as the "two-step" nature of decision making under uncertainty, whereby decision makers must first formulate a "most probable forecast" (captured by p e above), and then assess the "credence" of this forecast before deciding how to act. In this way, anything that affects the "credence" of a forecast can alter behaviour quite independently of changes in the forecast itself -which is precisely what is allowed for in the expectations-augmented Phillips curve above. 14 14 The obvious contrast here is with the canonical version of rational expectations, formed as
where ' Ψ constitutes a complete information set (including the time-invariant "true" model of th n rocess), and factors such as animal spirits exert no influence on behaviour either indirectly ( directly (as in the expectations-augmented Phillips curve above). The key characteristic of rational expectations so-defined is that they cannot be systematically wrong. In contrast, expectations formed un uncertainty on the basis of the incomplete information set ψ can be systematically wrong, and decis makers are aware of this -hence the role and importance of the second step in the decision making process described above.
In order to achieve conditional closure we must still specify the precise form of ( E p Ω) and describe the behaviour of Θ. The latter is achieved by once again "locking up without ignoring" a feature of the dynamics of our model by assuming that Θ = Θ .
15
In order to specify ( E p Ω) , meanwhile, we appeal to the claim originally made by Keynes (1936 Keynes ( , 1937 inflation targeting -the pursuit of low inflation enshrined in a clearly announced target that public policy authorities credibly and accountably commit to achieve -is a specific example of how policy authorities can engage in the creation of one such "conventional anchor" for expectations. 16 In light of all this, then, we write:
15 Alternatively, Θ=Θ can be interpreted as a "equilibrium of action" (Chick, 2002) , in which even in the absence of evidence confirming the realization of expectations, decision makers find no basis in current to ch o one way in which inflation ity m authors the management of expectat economic events ange the credence they attach to these expectations. 16 Note that in this way, before we have even begun to explore the macroeconomic effects of inflation targeting, the theory of decision making under uncertainty draws attention t targeting might prove useful in the context of a Post Keynesian economy, by creating a degree of stabil (conditional on the salience and durability of the conventions of inflation targeting) in inflation expectations and wage and price setting behaviour that need not otherwise exist.
This observation seems to be in keeping with the recurrent emphasis of some mainstrea (e.g., Woodford 2003, ch. 1) on the role of monetary policy and central banking in ions. Woodford (2004) , for instance, claims that central banking is not like guiding a spacecraft, because whilst a spacecraft follows a trajectory that depends on constantly changing factors, it does not depend on the vehicle's own expectations about where it is heading. Hence the advantage of commitment to a systematic approach to monetary policy (e.g., an inflation target plus an appropriately chosen policy rule) as a means of influencing the expectations of decision makers, which do affect the trajectory of the 
economy. Although Keynes is not cited by Woodford, recall that he also believed the natural sphere to be an inappropriate source of analogies for social theorizing, given that economic reality is not inherently regular and law-like in the same precise way that natural phenomena are. In his insightful 'Apple's Tale', where Keynes rejects the possibility of creating a 'Newtonian Economy', one can find him noting that "The pseudo-analogy with the physical sciences leads directly counter to the habit which is most important for an economist proper to acquire ... I mentioned before that [economics] deals with motives, expectations, psychological uncertainties ... It is as though the fall of the apple to the ground depended on the apple's motives, on whether it is worth while falling on the ground, and whether the ground wanted the apple to fall, and on mistaken calculations on the part of the apple as to how far it was from the centre of the earth" (CW JMK, XIV, p. 300).
We can now solve for equilibrium by imposing the equilibrium conditions on equations [5] and [6] . This yields the isoclines:
and: respectively. Note that r * is decreasing in y T : the higher the target level of output, the smaller the equilibrium rate of interest must be. This is in keeping with the inverse relationship between y and r in equation [1] . Meanwhile, Z * is increasing in p T and decreasing in y T : a higher inflation target means that policy can relax its efforts to restrain either the ability or willingness of workers to increase the rate of growth of nominal wages, whilst a higher output target requires more vigilance in this regard, because of the direct relationship between y and p in equation [2a] . underlying structure of the economy: not only are the policy authorities able to both set and achieve an inflation target (establishing the partial compatibility of inflation targeting with the economy), they are able to do so without real costs (in terms of the equilibrium level of output) and hence without thwarting the achievement of any output target set independently of p T . 18 To see this latter result, consider Figure 1 below, which plots the isoclines in equations [7] and [8] assuming two different target rates of inflation.
As is clear from Figure 1 , decreasing the target rate of inflation (from 1 But from our point of view this result is trivial since it makes the level of output entirely subservient to the policy authorities' inflation target, and thus amounts to no more than the dedicated use of macroeconomic policy to pursue low inflation (as envisaged by mainstream proponents of inflation targeting such as Mishkin, 2002 ) at all costs. It is thus not equivalent to what is identified by Setterfield (2006a) as configuring macroeconomic policy so as to make inflation targeting fully compatible with the structure of the economy. Instead, it is precisely the sort of outcome that is feared by heterodox critics of inflation targeting (see, for example, Atesoglu and Smithin, 2006; Davidson, 2006; Michl, 2006) . 19 Note that, in keeping with our earlier observation that Z * varies directly with p T , the equilibrium value of Z will also be affected. consistent with the change in the policy authorities' output target. The equilibrium rate of inflation remains unchanged, equal to the authorities' (given) inflation target.
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The Impact of Different Policy Reaction Functions
We now turn to the impact of different policy reaction functions on the desirability of inflation targeting and the stability of macroeconomic equilibrium in a Post Keynesian economy. We adopt alternative specifications for the interest rate reaction function and the incomes policy reaction function (equations [3] and [4] ) that differ from one another depending on whether they take into account the output target and/or the inflation target. Ultimately, there is a range of reaction functions that can result from the discretionary choices of the policy authorities, and the issue we wish to consider is to what extent these discretionary policy choices enhance or diminish the compatibility of inflation targeting with a Post Keynesian economy.
Let us first consider a situation in which the interest rate reaction function is given by equation [3] , but the incomes policy reaction function in [4] is extended to include the output gap. The rationale for this extension is that y affects p in [2a], so it is reasonable for the policy authorities to manipulate Z in anticipation of changes in p when y < y T .
Formally, this extended incomes policy reaction function is given by:
Since the interest rate reaction function is still described by equation but also an equilibrium configuration that is similarly stable. Indeed, this equilibrium configuration could be described by a figure similar to Figure 1 , the only differences being that the y -intercept of the 0 p = isocline would now be closer to the origin and its slope would be flatter. 20 As in the basic model of the previous section, then, the policy authorities can successfully pursue a lower inflation target without this affecting the equilibrium of the real economy and hence their ability to achieve their stated output target. Intuitively, this is because the extended incomes policy function, which incorporates the output gap, remains complimentary to the operation of the interest rate rule.
Let us now consider a situation in which we retain the incomes policy reaction function in equation 
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Let us now consider a situation in which the interest rate reacts to changes in the inflation gap, while the willingness and ability of workers to bid up the rate of growth of nominal wages reacts to changes in the output gap. In comparison with the basic model of the previous section, therefore, the gap to which each one of the policy instruments reacts is inverted. Here, we are modelling a central bank that is concerned solely with inflation, while the elected authority sees itself as attempting to increase labour market "flexibility" -which in a Post Keynesian economy effectively means increasing worker insecurity and hence reducing the ability of workers to push for nominal wage increases -as y rises (and hence unemployment falls), in the belief that such measures are essential to increasing the 22 It may be argued that the sort of structural adjustment policies that seek to increase labour market flexibility are usually pursued without reference to the business cycle (i.e., the proximity of y to y T ). But our interpretation of the inverted Z reaction function above -which suggests that y > y T gives impetus to policies that claim to be increasing labour market flexibility -is plausible. Hence y > y T makes it easier to pursue labour market flexibility policies. The Clinton-era welfare reforms in the US, for example, were achieved at a time (during the late 1990s) when unemployment was below the estimated value of the NAIRU in the US (i.e., when output was above the target level implied by this estimated NAIRU). Alternatively, we might contrast the comparative ease with which a low unemployment/high (relative to potential) output economy such as Sweden has traditionally enforced strict rules with regard to the duration of unemployment insurance benefits with the problems faced by the French government in the spring of 2006 when it attempted to increase the ease with which young workers could be fired in a high unemployment/low (relative to potential) output economy.
Combining this expression with both [4b] and [14]
, we arrive at:
We can now solve for equilibrium by imposing the conditions 0 y p = = on equations [14] and [15] . This yields the isoclines:
and:
It follows directly from [16] that * T p p = , and using this result in conjunction with [17] we find that This situation is depicted in Figure 4 , which plots the isoclines given by equations
[16] and [17] . It should be noted that two different inflation targets (for instance, But both equilibria will be saddle-point unstable. Hence Figure 4 does not illustrate that the policy authorities can (in general) successfully choose between inflation targets. Instead, it shows only that different inflation targets imply different saddle-point unstable equilibrium configurations, with different equilibrium inflation rates corresponding to the same equilibrium output level.
[FIGURE 4 GOES HERE]
Similarly unstable equilibrium configurations will obtain in two other situations.
The first one combines the inverted interest rate reaction function given by equation [3b] and the extended incomes policy reaction function given by equation [4a] . This situation is analogous to having a Post Keynesian elected authority (trying to use incomes policies to address inflation) combined with an independent central bank focused solely on 23 Recall that our model is only conditionally or provisionally closed and that the true underlying decision making environment is one of fundamental uncertainty. Since self-aware decision makers understand this (albeit to a degree that will vary between individuals depending on what Dequech (2000) calls their "uncertainty perception"), we would not expect decision makers to spontaneously "jump" onto this stable arm -as might be expected in a system in which closure is absolute and decision makers form rational expectations. The likely instability of the system described above will thus not be automatically resolved, with the result that stability in this system is a special case. It also follows that any "tensions" -be they logical or socio-political -that arise as the result of instability must be addressed by processes from which the model developed above abstracts and that are beyond the scope of this paper. Once again we are reminded here that we are dealing with an open system and that our model is necessarily a local approximation of this larger system. inflation. The result is a policy regime involving an excessive focus on the part of the policy authorities on inflation: neither the elected authority nor the central bank has as its explicit objective the level of y. Hence although policy making in this regime is not strictly orthodox in its execution, the focus on inflation to the exclusion of real economic performance is.
While the rate of change of output in this case is given by [14] , the rate of change of inflation must now be written as:
As in the previous scenario, the equilibrium configuration is given by We can solve for equilibrium by imposing the conditions 0 y p = = on equations [10] and [19] . While the isocline corresponding to the former condition is given by equation
[12], the isocline corresponding to the latter is given by: This situation is depicted in Figure 5 , which is similar to Figure 3 . The major difference is that the isocline is now flatter than the 0 p = 0 y = isocline, as implied by equations [12] and [20] . As in the situation described in Figure 3 , any two different inflation or output targets will give rise to two different equilibrium configurations, both consistent with * T y y = and
But both equilibria will be saddle-point unstable.
Hence, as before, the policy authorities cannot simply choose between two different inflation or output targets. Rather, a higher (lower) output (inflation) target merely implies a different saddle-point unstable (and therefore generally unachievable) equilibrium configuration with the same inflation (output) level and a proportionally higher (lower) output (inflation) level.
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A further permutation that merits attention involves the situation in which both the interest rate reaction function and the incomes policy reaction function respond to both the output gap and the inflation gap, as in equations [3a] and [4a] . This scenario is consistent with Post Keynesian policy making on the part of both the central bank and the elected authorities, but both policy instruments are now being adjusted in response to both policy objectives (in contrast with policy making in the original model in section 2, which involves the dedicated adjustment of each policy instrument in response to just one objective). As the following results show, this less precisely focused pursuit of policy can be dangerous, depending on the size of the policy reaction coefficients. Hence, while the rate of change of output is given by equation [10] , the rate of change of inflation is now given by:
We can solve for equilibrium by imposing the conditions 0 y p = = on equations [10] and [21] . While the isocline corresponding to the former condition is given by equation
[12], the isocline corresponding to the latter is given by: and fuller versions of the current policy orthodoxy, the results above for the full policy orthodoxy regime suggest that in a Post Keynesian economy, the more orthodox the policy blend becomes, the worse are the consequences for macroeconomic stability and hence the viability of inflation targeting.
Conclusions
The purpose of this paper has been to build on Setterfield's (2006a) Extended Post Keynesian Model (EPKM), which purports to demonstrate the potential compatibility of inflation targeting with a Post Keynesian macroeconomic environment.
We extend the EPKM in two ways: first, by introducing an explicitly Post Keynesian theory of inflation expectations; and second, by considering a variety of policy reaction functions that may result from the discretionary intervention in the economy of both monetary and non-monetary policy authorities.
Our results corroborate Setterfield's (2006a) claim that, with the correct policy mix, it is possible to make inflation targeting fully compatible with the operation of a Post Keynesian economy. In other words, it is quite possible for the policy authorities to both set and achieve an inflation target without real costs (i.e., without thwarting the achievement of any target level of real activity set independently of the inflation target).
Indeed, our results suggest that in achieving this full compatibility of inflation targeting with the structure of a Post Keynesian economy, policy makers have more latitude in the design of policy than was originally envisaged by Setterfield (2006a) .
A second and equally important conclusion pertains to limits to the policy-making latitude alluded to above. The results in this paper suggest that policies that are orthodox in either their design and execution or even their essential orientation (with regard to the privileging of inflation over real economic outcomes) are ill-suited to a Post Keynesian economy. More specifically, the more orthodox the policy blend becomes in a Post
Keynesian economy, the more adverse are the consequences for both macroeconomic stability and the viability of inflation targeting. 
